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ABSTRACT 
We consider an n-player bargaining problem where the utility 
possibility set is compact, convex, and stricly comprehensive. We 
show that a stationary subgame perfect Nash equilibrium exists, 
and that, if the Pareto surface is differentiable, all such equilibria 
converge to the Nash bargaining solution as the length of a time 
period between offers goes to zero. Without the differentiability 
assumption, convergence need not hold. 
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 1 Introduction
One of the most celebrated observations in the bargaining literature is by
Binmore, Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1985), who show that the unique sub-
game perfect equilibrium outcome of the two-player alternating o¤ers bar-
gaining game á la Rubinstein (1982) converges to the Nash bargaining solu-
tion when frictions vanish, i.e., when the length of time period that it takes
to make o¤ers and counter o¤ers goes to zero.
We study how far these results extend to a multiplayer setting. To do
this, we employ the natural multiplayer version of the alternating o¤ers bar-
gaining game by Binmore (1985), Herrero (1985), and Shaked (as reported
by Osborne and Rubinstein, 1990).1
Vastness of equilibria is a well known problem of multiplayer bargaining
games. To circumvent the problem, we shall focus on equilibria in stationary
strategies. It is known that under stationarity restriction convergence does
hold (see Sutton, 1986) when bargaining concerns linear, one dimensional
cake.2 Our question is whether convergence holds if we relax the restrictions
on the underlying physical structure.
While in the two player case the underlying physical structure is imma-
terial, in the multiplayer case it is not. The one-cake restriction removes a
large portion of interesting trade-o¤s between players over which bargaining
could take place. In fact, we prove via an example that convergence of sta-
tionary equilibria to the Nash solution need not hold when the utility domain
is only asked to meet the more liberal assumptions made in the cooperative
bargaining literature, i.e. that the payo¤s are drawn from a compact, con-
vex and comprehensive utility possibility set.3 Such more general utility set
can be generated e.g. by multiplicity of goods or consumption externalities.
Our aim is to delineate conditions under which convergence does take place
in such a utility set.
We start by showing that a stationary subgame perfect equilibrium ex-
ists in any compact, convex, and comprehensive utility possibility set. To
our knowledge, this is the most general existence result concerning station-
ary bargaining equilibria. Our main result is that by slightly restricting the
utility space the convergence result can be saved: all stationary equilibria
converge to the Nash bargaining solution if the Pareto surface is di¤eren-
tiable.4
A distinctive feature of our analysis is - since no specic correspondence
1Players are ordered into a circle. A player (say 1) proposes an outcome. If all other
players accepts the proposal, then it is implemented. Otherwise, the next player (say 2)
in the order makes an o¤er. The play continues this way until an o¤er is accepted.
2Chatterjee and Sabourian (2000) show that the stationarity restriction is without loss
of generality if players are complexity averse.
3Thomson and Lensberg (1989) is an authorative reference.
4We thank an associate editor for suggesting this weakening of our original restriction.
1need be determined between payo¤s and the physical environment - that a
closed form representations of strategies and payo¤s cannot be used. Instead,
the results have to be derived via indirect means. At the heart of the proof
of the convergence is a novel dimensionality argument.5
There is a great number of work on q-player non-cooperative bargaining
games. Herrero (1985) and Sutton (1986) demonstrate the problems in
extending the number of players beyond two. The convergence to the Nash
bargaining solution typically requires that the bargaining game has a unique
subgame perfect equilibrium. Various examples of such games are available
in Chae and Yang (1988, 1994), Huang (2004), Krishna and Serrano (1996),
and Suh and Wen (2006).
2 The set up
There is a set f1>===>qg of players and a nonempty, compact, convex and
strictly comprehensive utility possibility set X ½ Rq
+=6>7 The vector of utili-
ties is denoted by x =( x 1 >===>x q)>or x =( x l >x ¡ l)=The (weak and strong)
Pareto frontier of X is then dened by S := fx 2 X : y 6A x> for all y 2 Xg=
Delay is costly: The present value of player l*s next period utility xl is
¢xl> where 0 ??1is the common discount factor, and ¢ A 0 is the
length between two stages=
We study a class of unanimity bargaining games, dened as follows.
² At stage w =0 >1 === player l =( w+1)modq makes an o¤er y 2 X and
the players m 6= l accept or reject the o¤er in the ascending order of
their index.
² If all m 6= l accept, then y is implemented. Otherwise the game moves
to stage w +1 .
We concentrate on the stationary (subgame perfect Nash) equilibria of
the game, where:
1. Each l*s proposal is dependent only on the continuation game.
2. Each l*s acceptance decision in period w depends only on the o¤er on
the table and the continuation game.
5Kultti and Vartiainen (2007) develop a similar argument in a di¤erent context.
6Vector notation: { = | if {l ¸ |l for all l >{¸|i¤ { = | and not {l = |l for all l>
and {A|i¤ {l A| lfor all l=
7[ ½ Rn
+ is comprehensive if { 2 [ and { ¸ | ¸ 0 imply | 2 [= It is strictly




l¡m> if l ¸ m
l¡ m + q> if l ? m=
Given the stationarity assumption, player m always o¤ers xm when it is his
turn to make an o¤er. Since player m*s o¤er y =( y 1 >===>y q)is accepted if
yl ¸ ¢(l>m)xl
l> for all l 6= m>




l> for all l>m= (1)
Thus an equilibrium is characterized by a prole (x1>===>x q) 2 Xq> where
each xl =( x l
1 >===>x l
q)2X species all players* payo¤s when it is l*s turn to
make an o¤er. We conclude that (x1>===>x q)is an equilibrium prole if and
only if it meets (1) for all l>m2f 1 >===>qg=
Theorem 1 A stationary equilibrium exists.
Proof. Assume ¢=1 . Let Xq be the q-copy of the utility set X.
Denote a typical element of Xq by (x1>===>x q). For any l>m> dene function
jl
m : X ! R+ such that
jl
m(xm) := (m>l)maxfxm :( x m>( x
m
n ) n 6 = m )2Xg = (2)
By the compactness of Xj l
mexists, and by the convexity of X >j l
mis contin-
uous. Let jl(¢): =( j l
m( ¢ ))q
m=1 : Xq ! Rq
+= Dene function l : Xq ! R+ such
that
l(x1>===>x q) := maxf{ 2 R : {jl(x1>===>xq) 2 Xg >
for all (x1>===>xq)2Xq=
By the compactness of Xq, l is well dened, and by the convexity of Xq>
l is continuous. Construct a function kl : Xq ! Rq
+ such that
kl(x1>===>x q) := jl(x1>===>x q)minfl(x1>===>x q)>1g>
for all (x1>===>xq)2Xq=
Let k(x1>===>x q)=( k 1 ( x 1 >===>x q)>===>k q(x 1>===>xq))= Then







k is a continuous function. By
Brouwer*sT h e o r e m ,t h e r ei sa
¡
y 1 >===>yq¢
in Xq such that
k(y1>===>yq)=( y 1 >===>yq)= (3)
3If also
j(y1>===>yq)2Xq> (4)
then j(y1>===>yq)=( y 1 >===>yq), i.e., by (2),
yl
l = jl
l(yl) = maxfxl :( x l >( y l
n ) n 6= l)2Xg > for all l> (5)
yl
m = jl
m(yl)=  ( m>l)maxfxm :( x m>( y
m
n ) n 6= m)2Xg > for all l 6= m> (6)




m> for all l> m=
Thus (4) is su¢cient for (y1>===>yq) to satisfy (1).














But, by (2), jl
l(yl) = maxfxl :( x l >y l
¡ l)2Xg>i.e. (jl
l(yl)>y l
¡ l)is the element
in X that maximizes l*s payo¤ given that the other players get at least yl
¡l>
a contradiction to (9).
3 Relationship with the Nash solution


















the hyperbola that contains x. Note that, by construction, xQ is the unique
point in which X is supported by a hyperbola, this time by K(xQ)=
4It is not di¢cult to see that equilibrium o¤ers x1(¢)>===>x q(¢) under














The last expression is independent of the proposer index m=
Theorem 2 Let S be di¤erentiable. Then all stationary equilibrium out-
comes converge to xQ as ¢ tends to 0=
The proof can be summarized as follows. Consider the three player case.
Think of the surface S of X as a chart of 1-dimensional curves, each re-
 ecting an intersection of S and a hyperbola= Identify the equilibrium o¤ers
x1(¢)>x 3(¢)>x 3(¢) under ¢= As ¢ becomes small, the maximum distance
between vectors x1(¢)>x 2(¢)>x3(¢) becomes small. Since, by (11), they all
lie in the same hyperbola, they must either converge to the Nash solution,
or, in the limit, the vectors are contained by a 1 -dimensional subspace (see
Fig. 1). We show that x1(¢)>x 2(¢)>x 3(¢) are always linearly indepen-
dent, and hence cannot be embedded into a 1¡dimensional subspace. Thus
x1(¢)>x 2(¢)>x 3(¢) cannot converge anywhere but to the Nash solution.
[FIGURE 1 AROUND HERE]




equilibrium o¤er when the period length is ¢ A 0. Note that, since X
is bounded, the di¤erence (¡¢(l>m) ¡ 1)x
m
l(¢) tends to 0 as ¢ becomes




implies that xm(¢) and xl(¢)> for all l>m> approach one another as ¢ tends
to 0=
Let f¢g be a subsequence under which x1(¢)>===>xq(¢) converge to x¤=
Since X is bounded, it su¢ces for us to show that x¤ = xQ= All the limits
below are taken with respect to the sequence f¢g=
It will be easier to work with logarithmized objects since logarithmiza-
tion transforms hyperbolas into hyperplanes without a¤ecting the nature of
5local properties of the objects.8 For expositional reasons, denote the loga-
rithmized variables by
¹ x = lnx = (lnx1>===>lnxq)> for any x 2 X>
¹ V = f¹ x : x 2 Vg> for any V µ Rq
++>




l( ¢ )=¢ ¹ (l>m)+¹ x l
l (¢)> for all l>m= (12)
Logarithmization preserves the convexity of X and the di¤erentiability of S=
Thus ¹ S is an q¡1-manifold supporting, at each of its point, a unique q¡1
dimensional hyperplane. In particular, it supports a unique hyperplane at
¹ x¤=
































Construct the q ¡ 1 -dimensional hyperplane O¢ such that>
O¢ =
½













Since (13) is independent of the index m> it follows that




> > > > > <











































> > > > > =
> > > > > ;
>
8Since it is easier to verify whether an object can be embedded into a hyperplane than
into a hyperbola.
9To be precise, logarithmic scales require that all equilibrium o¤ers are bounded away
from zero for all l and all ¢ A 0. This fact is easy to verify from the equilibrium conditions.
6a collection of q¡ 1 linearly independent vectors. By (12)> the collection of
equilibrium o¤ers can now be written compactly
f¹ x1(¢)>===> ¹ xq
l (¢)g = (¹ xl
l(¢))q




l=1 +¢ ¹ F ½ O¢> for all ¢=









l=1> for all ¢= (16)
Let O(¹ x) be the hyperplane that supports ¹ X at ¹ x=11 Since S is compact
and di¤erentiable, there is a function A0such that (%) ! 0 as % ! 0,
and such that (see Fig. 2)
(k¹ x ¡ ¹ yk) ¸
minfk¹ y ¡ ¹ y0k :¹ y 02O (¹ x)g
k¹ x¡¹ yk
> for all ¹ x> ¹ y 2 ¹ S= (17)
For a formal proof of this, see Proposition 3 in the appendix.
[FIGURE 2 AROUND HERE]
By (17),
(
° °¹ xl(¢) ¡ ¹ x1(¢)
° °) ¸
minf
° °¹ xl(¢) ¡ ¹ y
° ° :¹ y2O (¹ x1(¢))g






° °¹ xl(¢) ¡ ¹ x1(¢)
° °)=
Since
° °¹ xl(¢) ¡ ¹ x1(¢)
° ° ! 0 for all l it follows that ¢ ! 0 as ¢ ! 0=
Let k[k be the sup-norm of the set [> i.e. k[k = sup{>|2[ k{ ¡ |k= By
(15)> °
°¹ xl(¢) ¡ ¹ x1(¢)
°
° · ¢¹  kFk> for all l= (19)
10By an a¢ne transformation of a set [ ½ R
p we mean a map [ 7! d[ + e> for
d 2 R++ and e 2 R
p> where d[ +e = fd{+e : { 2 [g=
11That is, O(¹ x)=f {2R
q:s{ = ng> where s 2 R
q and n 2 R such that s¹ y ¸ n> for all
¹ y 2 ¹ X> and s¹ x = n.
7By (18) and (19)>
minf
°
°¹ xl(¢) ¡ ¹ y
°
° :¹ y2O (¹ x1(¢))g· ¢ ¢ ¹ k Fk> for all l= (20)
From (20) we have that
(¹ xl
l(¢))q
l=1 +¢ ¹ F ½
©
¹ x : k¹ x¡ ¹ yk ? ¢ ¢ ¹ k Fk and ¹ y 2 O(¹ x1(¢))
ª
=

























That is, F is contained in the ¢ kFk -neighborhood of an q¡1 -dimensional
















By construction, ¹ x¤ 2 O¤= Suppose that O(¹ x¤) 6= O¤> i.e. the hyperplane
that supports ¹ X at ¹ x¤ does not coincide with the hyperplane O¤= Since both
O(¹ x¤) and O¤ are q¡1 dimensional hyperplanes, the hyperplane O(¹ x¤)\O¤
is only q¡2 dimensional. Since F contains q ¡ 1 independent vectors, and
¢ ! 0, there is ¢0 A 0 such that for all ¢ ? ¢0,
F 6½
½












Since ¹ S is di¤erentiable and ¹ x1(¢) ! ¹ x¤, it follows that O¢ ! O¤ and
O(¹ x1(¢)) ! O(¹ x¤)=12 Thus there is ¢00 ? ¢0 such that for all ¢ ? ¢00,
F 6½
½














which contradicts (16) and (21). Thus O(¹ x¤)=O ¤ =
Since O(¹ x¤)=O ¤ ,O ¤supports ¹ X at ¹ x¤= Since, by denition, O¤ is the
log-transformed hyperbola K(x¤)> and ¹ X is the log-transformed utility set
X, this must mean that the X is supported by the hyperbola K(x¤) at x¤=
Thus x¤ = xQ=
12W h e r et h el i m i t sa r ed e  ned with respect to the normals of the hyperplanes.
84 Necessity of the Di¤erentiability of S
The result of the previous section, which is the main nding of the paper,
is based on the local properties of the Pareto frontier, i.e. it shows that the
Nash program works in any environment where the Pareto frontier is locally
isomorphic to a hyperplane. However, when this is not the case, the result
need not hold. Indeed, to this end we argue that the convergence result
is sensitive to the di¤erentiability assumption. We give an example of a
scenario where stationary equilibria do not converge to the Nash bargaining
solution.
Let
X = fx 2 R3
+ : x1 + x2 · 1>x 3· 1 g =
Here 1 and 2 bargain over a linear cake and 3 is a "dummy" player, without
strategic signicance.
Equilibrium condition (1) implies that the stationary equilibrium o¤ers













In equilibrium, players do not waste their own consumption possibilities
when making o¤ers. This means
x1
1 =1 ¡ x 1
2 >
x 2























 ¢ ¡  2¢
1 ¡ 3¢ >
2¢ ¡ 4¢
1 ¡ 3¢ > 1
¶
=























9Thus the convergence point x¤ of the stationary equilibrium does not coin-
cide with the Nash solution xQ (see Fig. 3). Hence the di¤erentiability of
S is crucial for the convergence result (the seminal idea is by Lensberg and
Thomson, 1988).
[FIGURE 3 AROUND HERE]
However, our equilibrium is not the only stationary equilibrium that X
entertains. This is due to the fact that X is comprehensive but not strictly
comprehensive, as demanded by our characterization (1). However, using
the above reasoning, it is clear that X can be approximated by a strictly
comprehensive problem whose unique stationary equilibrium is close to the
equilibrium we characterize.13 Thus the no-convergence result does hold
also in the class of convex, compact, and strictly comprehensive problems.
Discussion To understand why the convergence to the Nash solution
does not always hold, note that in the above example, there is no tradeo¤
between player 3 and the other players. Players 1 and 2 e¤ectively bargain
against one another, and the only e¤ect of the existence of 3 is to delay 1*s
o¤er once 2 has rejected his o¤er. The role of di¤erentiability is to guarantee
that the Pareto surface is locally fully competitive; a small chunk of payo¤
of one player can be distributed to others in any proportion. This means
that the details of the players* intra game relations, e.g. dummyness as
in the above example, do not a¤ect bargaining when the discount factor
becomes small. Hence, in the limit, each player regards the other players
symmetrically. Because of the convexity of the problem, this property is
met locally only in the Nash solution. This is what drives the convergence
result.
In the two player context, however, there is no problem in treating all
opponents symmetrically as each player only faces one opponent. This guar-
antees convergence even when the Pareto surface is not di¤erentiable. Tech-
nically, this is mirrored by the fact that the intersection of the Pareto surface
and a hyperbola is zero dimensional, and hence cannot be connected. Be-
cause of this, the shrinking set of players equilibrium o¤ers cannot converge
13Think of the problem X
% = X(1¡%)+Y %> where Y = fx 2 R
3
+ :2 x 1+2x 2+x 3·3g>
and %?0 . Now X
% is strictly comprehensive and for small %> the unique stationary
equilibrium converges to a point close to x¤=
10anywhere but to the point of intersection of the highest hyperbola and the
Pareto surface.
To interpret this observation in terms of the so called "Nash program",
which aims at reconciling the strategic approach and the axiomatic one,
note that a non-di¤erentiable utility space can always be approximated by
di¤erentiable ones. Since the Nash solution is continuous with respect to
small changes in the Pareto surface, it must be the case that the nonco-
operative equilibrium correspondence is discontinuous with respect to the
underlying payo¤ parameters. Thus the "problem" seems to be with the
noncooperative approach; (the limit) outcome of noncooperative bargaining
can be sensitive to the ne details of the underlying physical model.
On the other hand, the non-convergence result may be interpreted as a
manifestation of the fact that the Nash IIA axiom does not adequately take
into account categorial changes in players* relationships, e.g. that one player
becomes competely independent in terms of payo¤s. Indeed, replacing IIA
with the multilateral stability condition of Lensberg and Thomson (1988)
(see also Thomson and Lensberg, 1990, ch 8), whose target is precisely that,
is known to characterize the Nash solution only in the domain of smooth
problems.
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12A Appendix
In the following proposition, all variables are dened as in Theorem 2.
Proposition 3 There is a function A0such that (%) ! 0 as % ! 0 and
such that
(k¹ x ¡ ¹ yk) ¸
minfk¹ y ¡ ¹ y0k :¹ y 02O (¹ x)g
k¹ x¡¹ yk
> for all ¹ x> ¹ y 2 ¹ S=
Proof. Since ¹ S is di¤erentiable, it supports at every ¹ x 2 ¹ S an q¡dimensional
ball with radius u(¹ x) A 0= Since ¹ S is di¤erentiable, and a ball is locally
isomorphic to a hyperplane, it su¢ces for us to show that u is uniformly
bounded below by some A0on ¹ S=
If u is not uniformly bounded by any A0on ¹ S, then there is a
sequence f¹ xng of elements in ¹ S such that u(¹ xn) converges to 0= Since ¹ S
is di¤erentiable at ¹ x if and only if S is di¤erentiable at x> it follows that
there is a corresponding sequence fxng of elements in S such that u(xn)> the
strictly positive radius of a ball supporting S at xn> converges to 0= But this
























15Aboa Centre for Economics (ACE) was founded in 
1998 by the departments of economics at the Turku 
School of Economics, Åbo Akademi University and 
University of Turku. The aim of the Centre is to 
coordinate research and education related to 
economics in the three universities. 
Contact information: Aboa Centre for Economics, 
Turku School of Economics, Rehtorinpellonkatu 3, 
20500 Turku, Finland. 
Aboa Centre for Economics (ACE) on Turun kolmen 
yliopiston vuonna 1998 perustama yhteistyöelin. Sen 
osapuolet ovat Turun kauppakorkeakoulun kansan-
taloustieteen oppiaine, Åbo Akademin national-
ekonomi-oppiaine ja Turun yliopiston taloustieteen 
laitos. ACEn toiminta-ajatuksena on koordinoida 
kansantaloustieteen tutkimusta ja opetusta Turun 
kolmessa yliopistossa. 
Yhteystiedot: Aboa Centre for Economics, Kansan-
taloustiede, Turun kauppakorkeakoulu, 20500 Turku. 
www.tse.fi/ace 
ISSN 1796-3133 